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ABSTRACT 
While insider trading has been regulated in the vast majority of countries with 
financial markets, the efficacy of these regulations has only been sparsely examined. 
In this paper we examine the impact of major regulatory changes in New Zealand on 
the profitability and informational basis of insider transactions. We conclude that the 
law changes have both significantly reduced the profitability of insider trading and 
forced insiders to change the source of the information they use from private 
information to knowledge of market misvaluation. The results show that well 
constructed insider trading laws can be effective in controlling insider behaviour and 
profitability.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
That insider’s have an informational advantage over the rest of the market as a result 
of their relationship with their company has been proven in virtually every market that 
has examined the profitability of insidersi. However, despite the harm that insider 
trading causes to the market as a whole (increased costs of capital (Bhattacharya 
and Dauok (2002)), volatility (Kyle (1985)) and bid-ask spreads (Copeland and Galai 
(1988), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Chung and Chareonwong (1998)) and 
reduced liquidity (Ausubel (1990), Fishman and Hagerty (1995)), it also improves the 
informational efficiency of the market (Manne (1966), Kyle (1985), Leland (1992)). 
Regulators, as a result, have tended to treat insider trading as a necessary evil and 
have attempted to prevent the worst of it via regulation (Bhattacharya and Dauok 
(2002) show that over 80% of countries with financial markets have regulated insider 
trading). In particular regulators have focused on the information basis for the trades 
made by insiders in attempting to control the harm from insider trading. The literature 
(Piotroski and Roulstone (2003)) identifies two predominant sources for the 
informational advantage of insiders, specific knowledge and market mispricing.  
 
Specific knowledge refers to trading based on knowledge of undisclosed 
information that if released would have a price-impact, such as earnings 
announcements or merger plans. In virtually every market that has regulated insider 
trading, trades based on this information have tended to be prohibited. The reason 
this basis is treated so harshly lies in the fact that the details are ultimately released 
to the market via an announcement. As a result, trades based on this information are 
largely only redistributive as they offer little new information to the market that would 
not be known via the companies announcement while allowing insiders to reap 
significant abnormal returns at the expense of outside investors (Ausubel (1990)). 
For insiders however, it offers a relatively certain outcome as the market reaction and 
the timing of the reaction to the information contained within the announcement is 
relatively easy to determine.  
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By contrast, regulators have been quiet about the ability of insiders to exploit 
market mispricing. A number of papers have identified the superior ability of insiders 
to price the fundamental value of their company (Friederich, Gregory, Matako and 
Tonks (2002)). This allows them to accurately identify situations where the market 
has failed to accurately incorporate all the public information relating to the company. 
By informing the market of the details of the trade insiders are able to signal such 
mispricing to the market resulting in more accurate market prices. The result of this is 
to improve the efficient allocation of resources within the market. Trading on this 
information and the resulting signals also means that the insider in a similar role to 
that of an analyst (Fishman and Hagerty (1992), Khanna and Slezak (1994) and 
Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisniewski (2006)). Given the difficulty in disclosing such 
deviations from the fundamental price through other methods, these trades are 
important for the allocative efficiency of the market. However, insiders are likely to 
need a motivation to trade exclusively on this information given the market under-
reacts to information of insider trades in the short-run (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). 
As a result insiders face less certain and likely smaller profits exploiting market 
mispricing than those profiting from an upcoming announcement.  
 
While regulations have been used to balance the costs and benefits of insider 
trading, there has been little examination of the success of these efforts. In particular 
the impact of the structure or strictness of laws and their enforcement on insiders’ 
behaviour has been only lightly covered. Jaffe (1974) and Seyhun (1992) for instance 
both found that insider profitability was not affected by activities that were argued as 
increasing the cost of insider trading.  Garfinkel (1997), by contrast, found that the 
insiders were dissuaded from trading in the same direction as an upcoming 
announcement, i.e purchasing before good news and selling before bad news, by 
stricter laws. We seek to add to the limited evidence on the role of regulations in 
controlling insider profitability and the information they use to trade on.  
 
The literature on insider trading provides some further support for the belief 
that regulations can be effective in dealing with the consequences of insiders. 
Studies examining insider trading around announcements in the US, while not 
explicitly examining the role of regulation, show support for the findings of Garfinkel 
(1997). Studies on samples drawn predominantly from prior to the 1988 law changes 
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examined by Garfinkel tend to show insiders trading prior to an upcoming 
announcement (Karpoff and Lee (1991), Lee et al. (1992), Lamba and Khan (1999) 
and Elliot et al. (1984)). Studies based on sample periods after the changes show 
that insiders wait till after an announcement to trade and do so away from the 
direction of the market reaction (Sivakumar (1994), Noe (1999) and Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2003)). This change was argued as indicating a switch from short term 
information, such as the contents of an upcoming earnings announcement, to long 
term knowledge, including expectations about future cash flow realisations or 
predicted future growth rates. Such a finding suggests the increased cost of insider 
trading from the law changes have forced a change in the informational basis of 
insider trades to avoid the appearance of trading on material information.  
 
Evidence also exists to show regulations have had a positive impact in other 
areas affected by insiders. Beny (2005) examined an index rating the strength of 
insider trading laws and found that countries with stricter regimes had higher liquidity, 
more widely held share ownership and more accurate prices. Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002), while finding that the enactment of laws had little effect did conclude 
that the first enforcement of insider trading laws resulted in a significant reduction in 
the cost of capital. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2005) using the same sample also 
found that enforcement resulted in a marked increase in the analyst following of 
emerging and developing markets. Developed markets by contrast saw a significant 
increase following the enactment of the laws. The evidence therefore does suggest 
that regulations have had an impact on insider trading, although the evidence is not 
unanimous.  
 
Jaffe (1974) and Seyhun (1992) both concluded that events that they argued 
as having increased the cost of insider trading had resulted in little improvement and 
in the case of Seyhun had actually increased the volume of insider trading. One 
possible explanation for the differences in the findings between Jaffe and Seyhun 
and Garfinkel (1997) is the level of regulatory change. The law change examined in 
Garfinkel is noted as being a major increase in the severity of insider trading laws, 
including the introduction of bounties for those turning in insiders. The findings from 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and Bushman et al. (2005) also suggest that the 
mere presence of laws is not enough, that the laws must be sufficiently strict to pose 
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a real risk of enforcement. Further, Beny (2005) showed a clear relationship between 
the severity of insider trading regulation and the harm from insider trading. In this 
instance the situation of New Zealand provides an ideal case study within which to 
examine the effect on insiders profitability and the information they used, as it 
marked a significant and profound increase in the cost of insider trading and 
reduction in the benefits of insider trading.  
 
The New Zealand Situation 
The regime prior to the introduction of the SMAA has been the subject of scathing 
commentary regarding its ability to control insiders, particular in light of its in ability to 
secure a conviction after over a decade in effect. Two weaknesses of the previous 
system were of particular importance, the lack of a public regulator and the lack of 
timely disclosure by directors and executives. Previously, the other party to the trade 
or the issuing company were required to prosecute insiders. However, due to the 
cost and evidential burdens, traders affected by insiders have proven largely 
unprepared to pursue an action against an insider, while the issuing companies have 
proven reluctant to prosecute their own insiders. The result has been very few cases 
taken with no successesii.  
 
Further, the lack of timely disclosure has severely limited the benefit to the 
market of insiders trading. Chung and Charoenwong (1998) concluded that the 
market is unable to detect insiders trades unless they are disclosed. No disclosure, 
or delayed disclosure, means the market is unable to infer the insiders information. It 
also means that insiders are able to continue trading on inside information for much 
longer as the market is unable to adjust prices for their information resulting in 
significantly higher returns to insiders (Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001)). It also 
appears to have given insiders little reason not to trade on the most profitable 
information, knowledge of upcoming announcements, as the insiders had little reason 
to suspect their trades would be examined in depth once they were disclosed (on 
average 9-10 months later  as shown in Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2004)).  
 
Both these weaknesses were addressed in the SMAA with the Securities 
Commission (a publicly funded watchdog which already had oversight of the markets 
and statutory declarations) given the ability to prosecute where the issuing company 
 5 
refused and all corporate insiders (directors, executives and large blockholders) 
required to disclose within 5 days. Given the lack of disincentives not to use 
knowledge of upcoming announcements under the previous regime, and the 
significant tightening under the recent amendments, if regulations can influence the 
information that insiders use, and by extension their profitability, then it should be 
apparent in the New Zealand experiences.  
 
This study will explore the regulatory experiences of New Zealand to the help 
address the issue of whether regulations can be effective in limiting the profitability of 
insiders and controlling the information they trade on. Specifically we examine the 
enactment of the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 (SMAA) in New Zealand 
which was introduced to tighten an ineffective regime. The experience of New 
Zealand in going from a lax to tight legislative regime maybe of interest to policy 
makers in developing and emerging markets, many of whom while having enacted 
laws against insider trading have not enforced them due to weaknesses in their 
systems or a lack of political will (Stamp and Walsh (1996)).  
 
We start by examining the profitability of insiders for a sample of 1146 director 
transaction before and after the regulatory changes. We find significant out-
performance for both purchases and sales prior to the law changes but not after. 
Further, the change in profitability appears to be due to a change in the informational 
basis for the trades. We observe significant decreases post-change in the number of 
trades followed within 80 days by corporate announcements in the right direction. 
Further, pre-change profitability was predominantly driven by those trades preceding 
news in the expected direction. Post-change out-performance, on the other hand, is 
limited to situations where market prices have strongly deviated from the 
fundamental price. The results strongly suggest that the recent changes have been 
effective in discouraging insiders from trading or giving the appearance of trading on 
the basis of upcoming announcements.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will give a discussion 
of the sample employed and the methodology for determining the profitability of 
insiders and the source of information they rely on. Section 3 presents the empirical 
results while the final section concludes the paper.  
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II. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
To explore whether insider trading regulations can be effective in controlling the 
information that insiders trade on we examine director trades around the time of the 
introduction of the SMAA. We focus on directors exclusively as the old rules did not 
require executives to disclose at all and there are questions about the informational 
advantage and access to inside information of large block holders (Seyhun (1998)). 
Directors transactions were collected from all companies listed on the New Zealand 
Exchange over the period January 1996 – October 2005. Transactions for 2002, the 
year the amendment was enacted, were excluded from the study to prevent any bias 
from the preceding legislative events that occurred throughout 2002 leading up to the 
enactment. Transactions that occurred on the same day were combined into one 
trade based on the net number of shares traded. After removing transactions where 
there was insufficient data the sample consisted of 1121 transactions from 120 
companies. The sample was separated into two time periods, pre-change running 
from 1996-2001 (755 trades) and post-change from 2003-Oct 2005 (366 trades).  
 
Methodology 
We start by examining the ability of insiders to outperform the rest of the market. This 
is accomplished by calculating the cumulative abnormal returns earned by insiders 
over the 80 days following the trade. We calculate the abnormal returns using the 
Fama and French 3 factor model such that  
 
 ittitiftmtiitftit HMLSMBrrrr εβββα +++−+=− 321 )(   (1) 
 
where rit is the return on company i, rft is the risk free rate rmt is the return on the 
NZSE All index, SMB is the return from a portfolio of small stocks minus a portfolio of 
large stocks and HML is the return from a portfolio of high book-to-market firms 
minus a portfolio of low book-to-market firms. The daily portfolio returns were 
calculated for the top and bottom 30% of the universe of stocks, in this case non-
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financial firms listed on the NZX between 1993 and 2006 including delisted firms. 
Portfolio formation occurred on the 30th of June with returns measured from 1 July. 
Sorts for the SMB and HML portfolios were based on the prior end of calendar year 
values. Parameter estimates for the regression coefficients were estimated over the 
period -375,-125 days prior to the date of the trade. Those estimates were then 
applied to calculate the abnormal returns in the testing period, -125,80.  
 
We examine the issue of whether insiders are using knowledge of upcoming 
announcements in a similar fashion to that employed in Givoly and Palman (1985). 
We look at the period following an insiders trade and search for the first news 
announcement within 80 days which seems a reasonable estimate of the time before 
an announcement that an insider would be aware of the information. We classify 
news as either good bad or neutral as per Appendix A based on the criteria used in 
Palmon and Schneller (1980) and Fama (1998). We also categorised the 
announcements by the type of announcements into one of 7 categories based on the 
classifications of Pritamani and Singal (2001). If insiders are predominantly trading 
on the basis of the information contained in forthcoming announcements you would 
expect to see the majority of purchases before good news and sales before bad 
news.  
 
We also test to see if insiders are instead trading based on market mispricing, 
or when the market price deviates from the fundamental price. As demonstrated by 
Seyhun (1992) if insiders are trading based on expected price reversals you should 
see purchases following price declines and sales after a price appreciation. Rozeff 
and Zaman (1998) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2003) go further and note that this 
should be most apparent in situations where the price suffers the most deviation. 
This they argued occurred in value and growth firms where value firms tended to be 
undervalued and growth overvalued (Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vichny (1994)). We test whether insiders do appear to be trading in 
these firms using the book-to-market ratio as a proxy for value versus growth,.  
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 gives sample descriptive statistics separating the sample into pre and post-
change purchases and sales. Transactions per month have stayed largely the same 
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between the purchases and sales samples with the only major deviation being the 
7% increase in the number of transactions taking place in March following the 
introduction of the new laws. Sales also see a small spike in transactions in March 
however there are few other notable deviations between the two samples. The 
purchases per year show a large jump between the pre-change and post-change 
periods, largely driven by the 2003-2004 period. 2005 however was back to pre-
change levels. Sales on the other hand are at low end of the pre-change levels with 
2004 being significantly lower. The high purchases and low sales, however, maybe 
the result of strong performance on the New Zealand market over this time period. 
One point of interest though is the very small number of transactions in 2001 for both 
purchases and sales. One possible explanation is that insiders in an attempt to avoid 
regulation may have stopped or delayed trading to mask the problem. The final value 
given is the average shares per transaction. While there is a small increase in 
purchases post-change, the numbers are largely similar suggesting little difference 
between the two time periods. On the whole the descriptive statistics do not show a 
significant change following the introduction of the new laws.  
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Purchases Sales
Pre Change Post Change Pre Change Post Change 
Number % Number % Number % Number %
Transactions Per Month
January 24          6% 6            3% 9            3% 5            4%
February 21          5% 10          4% 24          8% 10          8%
March 43          10% 40          17% 32          10% 16          13%
April 47          11% 24          10% 25          8% 12          9%
May 42          10% 22          9% 24          8% 14          11%
June 33          8% 25          10% 29          9% 11          9%
July 22          5% 10          4% 17          5% 6            5%
August 33          8% 23          10% 32          10% 18          14%
September 45          10% 26          11% 26          8% 10          8%
October 45          10% 9            4% 32          10% 8            6%
November 51          12% 30          13% 38          12% 10          8%
December 29          7% 14          6% 32          10% 7            6%
Transactions Per Year
1995 76          60          
1996 59          63          
1997 65          52          
1998 78          49          
1999 66          44          
2000 74          42          
2001 17          10          
2003 90          48          
2004 82          34          
2005 67          45          
Average Shares/Transactions
180,886 237,794 311,851 301,711  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Pre-change includes the 755 transactions (435 purchases and 340 sales) that occurred between 
Jan 1996 and Dec 2001. Post-change includes the 366 transactions (239 purchases and 127 
sales) that occurred between Jan 2003 and Oct 2005. Transactions per month was measured as 
the total number of trades in a given month over the relevant time period. Transactions per year 
was measured as the total number of trades in a given year. Average shares per transaction was 
measured as the average shares traded over the relevant time period.  
 
 
III. RESULTS 
 
Insiders Performance 
If the legislative changes have been effective it would be expected that there would 
be a noticeable reduction in the profitability of insider’s transactions following their 
enactment. Table 2 gives details of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) earned 
by insiders both prior to the change in the laws and following their introduction. The 
results show a marked reduction in the profitability of insiders driven by both the 
purchase and sales sub-samples. The pre-change sub-samples both show 
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significance starting between the 0,20 (sales) and 0,40 (purchases) time periods with 
purchases earning 3.9% over the 0,80 day period while insiders sales avoid losses of 
nearly 6% compared to the market. By contrast in the post-change period insiders do 
not earn significant abnormal returns over any event period. Post-change purchase 
CARs are down nearly 50% and sales close to 80% after the new laws were 
introduced. These changes in profitability suggest the new laws have had a 
significant impact on the trading of insiders. These results also contrast somewhat 
with the evidence of other studies that have shown that changes in regulations had 
little or no impact on the profitability of insiders.  
 
 
Panel A: Insider Purchases
Pre-Change Post-Change
CAR CAR Difference
0-10 0.0064 0.0082 -0.0018
0-20 0.0112 0.0110 0.0002
0-40 0.0216 * 0.0163 0.0054
0-80 0.0390 *** 0.0219 0.0172 ***
Panel B: Insider Sales
Pre-Change Post-Change
CAR CAR Difference
0-10 0.0082 0.0120 -0.0038
0-20 0.0205 * 0.0217 -0.0012
0-40 0.0352 ** 0.0240 0.0112 ***
0-80 0.0597 *** 0.0130 0.0467 ***  
 
Table 2: Insiders Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Note: * = Significant at 10%, **= Significant at 5% and *** = Significant at 
1%. Pre-change includes the 755 transactions (435 purchases and 340 
sales) that occurred between Jan 1996 and Dec 2001. Post-change 
includes the 366 transactions (239 purchases and 127 sales) that 
occurred between Jan 2003 and Oct 2005. Abnormal returns were 
calculated using the Fama and French 3 Factor model such that 
ittitiftmtiitftit HMLSMBrrrr εβββα +++−+=− 321 )( where SMB is a 
portfolio of small company returns less a portfolio of large companies. 
HML is a portfolio of high book-to-market companies less a portfolio of 
low book-to-market firms. Portfolios were formed based on the top and 
bottom 30% of a universe of New Zealand companies listed between 
1993 and 2006 including delisted companies. Parameters were 
estimated over the period -375,-126. The significance of the difference 
between the pre and post-change samples was calculated using two-
sample t-tests.  
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Figures 1 and 2 offer some suggestion as to the cause of the differences in 
the CARs observed.  Figure 1 shows the CAR’s over the period -125,80 for the pre 
and post-change purchases. What can be seen is a change in the approach that 
insiders seem to be taking in trading. Prior to the legislative change, insiders 
purchases occur following a period of price increase that increases in magnitude 
following the trade. There appears to be no attempt to time their trading so that they 
purchase shares at a low point in its price history. By contrast, post-change 
purchases occur following a decrease in the price of shares of nearly 2%, suggesting 
insiders were timing their trades. Following the trade an increase in the price is 
observed taking the price to just above where it started.  
 
A similar pattern is observed in Figure 2 for the sales samples. Pre-change 
sales occur during a period of downward prices that intensifies following the trade. 
Post-change sales however, occur at the peak of a price increase of nearly 2% over 
nearly 4 months prior to the trade followed by a steep decline. It appears, therefore, 
that insiders have started timing their trades to make the most efficient use of periods 
of minor mispricing rather than what appears to be knowledge of major forthcoming 
price changes.  
 12 
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Figure 1: -125,80 Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Insider Purchases 
 
Note Pre-change includes 435 purchases that occurred between Jan 1996 and Dec 2001. Post-change includes 239 purchases that occurred between Jan 
2003 and Oct 2005. Abnormal returns were calculated using the Fama and French 3 Factor model such that 
ittitiftmtiitftit HMLSMBrrrr εβββα +++−+=− 321 )( where SMB is a portfolio of small company returns less a portfolio of large companies. HML is a 
portfolio of high book-to-market companies less a portfolio of low book-to-market firms. Portfolios were formed based on the top and bottom 30% of a 
universe of New Zealand companies listed between 1993 and 2006 including delisted companies. Parameters were estimated over the period -375,-126. Low 
BM includes the lowest 30% of trades based on the previous end of calendar year book-to-market ratio. High BM includes the highest 30% of trades based on 
the previous end of calendar year book-to-market ratio. 
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Figure 2: -125,80 Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Insider Sales 
 
 
Note Pre-change includes 340 sales that occurred between Jan 1996 and Dec 2001. Post-change includes 127 sales that occurred between Jan 2003 and 
Oct 2005. Abnormal returns were calculated using the Fama and French 3 Factor model such that 
ittitiftmtiitftit HMLSMBrrrr εβββα +++−+=− 321 )( where SMB is a portfolio of small company returns less a portfolio of large companies. HML is a 
portfolio of high book-to-market companies less a portfolio of low book-to-market firms. Portfolios were formed based on the top and bottom 30% of a 
universe of New Zealand companies listed between 1993 and 2006 including delisted companies. Parameters were estimated over the period -375,-126. Low 
BM includes the lowest 30% of trades based on the previous end of calendar year book-to-market ratio. High BM includes the highest 30% of trades based on 
the previous end of calendar year book-to-market ratio. 
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The Source of Insiders Performance 
The literature offers two possible explanations for insiders profitability, market 
mispricing and private information (Piotroski and Roulstone (2003)). The change in 
patterns observed in Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the new insider trading 
amendments may have forced insiders to switch between these two possible sources 
of profits.  We will examine the two sources separately to see if the legislative 
changes have resulted in a fundamental change in how insiders make their profits.  
 
Knowledge of Upcoming Announcements 
The first source of profitability we will explore is knowledge of upcoming 
announcements. Insiders by virtue of their positions are privy to confidential 
information about the company that once released will have a price impact. 
Numerous studies have shown evidence to suggest that insiders both possess this 
information and trade in advance of its release where regulations do not provide a 
sufficient disincentive (Karpoff and Lee(1991), Lee et al. (1992), Lamba and Khan 
(1999), Elliot et al. (1984), Sivakumar (1994), Noe (1999) and Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2003)). There have been numerous suggestions by a variety of 
commentators that prior to the recent law changes the insider trading regime in New 
Zealand was weak (Fitzsimons (1995), O’Sullivan (2000), Gaynor (2000)). The lack 
of a public watch dog to police insider trading rules, the lack of timely disclosure with 
regards to directors transactions and the use of private enforcement all contributed to 
an environment where insiders had little reason to fear fully using their information 
advantage. We investigate whether insiders in New Zealand do use this information 
by exploring the pattern of announcements following insider trades.   
 
To determine if insiders did predominantly base trading decisions on material 
information we examine the trades to see if a trade precedes an announcement in 
the ‘right’ direction i.e. a purchase followed by good news or a sale followed by bad 
news. The inference drawn from observing such a pattern being that the insider has 
traded based on knowledge of the likely price impact the information will have. 
Rather than limit this study to examining insider trades around one type of 
announcement, we explore the issue by examining the first announcement within 80 
days of an insiders trade. This allows us to investigate more fully the relationship 
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between insiders buying and selling and the flow of publicly disclosed information to 
the market and whether the introduction of new laws to strengthen the regime has 
altered this relationship.  
 
Panel A of Table 3 gives the break down of the purchase and sale trades both 
pre and post-change and the direction of the subsequent announcements. The pre-
change samples both have markedly higher percentages of trades in the right 
direction than their post-change counterparts. Pre-change purchases are followed by 
good news nearly 60% of the time, not as high as observed in Calvo and Lasfer 
(2002), who examine the UK, but much higher than the number followed by news in 
the wrong direction at just 16%. Post-change purchases by contrast are only followed 
by good news in 44% of cases while news in the wrong direction nearly doubles to 
32%.  
 
A similar pattern is apparent in the sales sample with pre-change sales being 
followed by news in the right direction in 45% of trades as opposed to just 19% of 
transactions for the post-change sample. The smaller percentage in the right 
direction for sales is likely due to these trades being less informationally driven in 
light of a number of other reasons to sell such as liquidity needs and diversification 
that do not exist for purchases. We also observe a doubling of the number of trades 
followed by news in the wrong direction from 27% pre-change to 52% post-trade. 
What is apparent between the pre and post-change samples is that there are fewer 
trades being conducted ahead of announcements in the same direction trade for both 
purchases and sales with concurrent increases in trades in the wrong direction.  
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Panel A: Raw Numbers and Percentages
Pre Change Purchases Post Change Purchases Pre Change Sales Post Change Sales
Announcement Direction Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Right Direction 254 58.39% 106 44.35% 143 44.69% 24 18.90%
Wrong Direction 73 16.78% 77 32.22% 87 27.19% 67 52.76%
Neutral 50 11.49% 24 10.04% 30 9.38% 12 9.45%
No Announcement 58 13.33% 32 13.39% 60 18.75% 24 18.90%
Total Trades 435 239 320 127
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Announcement Direction
Pre Change Purchases Post Change Purchases Pre Change Sales Post Change Sales
Announcement Direction CAR CAR CAR CAR
Right Direction 0.0597       ** 0.0174 0.1417 *** 0.0067
Wrong Direction 0.0096       0.0225 -0.0246 0.0173
Neutral 0.0321       0.0279 0.0127 0.0076
No Announcement 0.0110       0.0312 0.0125 0.0314  
 
Table 3: Trade Direction and CARs 
 
Note: * = Significant at 10%, **= Significant at 5% and *** = Significant at 1%. Pre-change includes the 755 transactions (435 purchases and 
340 sales) that occurred between Jan 1996 and Dec 2001. Post-change includes the 366 transactions (239 purchases and 127 sales) that 
occurred between Jan 2003 and Oct 2005. Right Direction represents purchases (sales) followed by good (bad) news. Wrong Direction 
represents purchases (sales) followed by bad (good) news. Neutral respresents trades followed by neutral news and No Announcement 
represents trades without an announcement within the following 80 days. Classifications of announcements as good, bad or neutral was 
based the criteria in Appendix 1. Abnormal returns were calculated using the Fama and French 3 Factor model such that 
ittitiftmtiitftit HMLSMBrrrr εβββα +++−+=− 321 )( where SMB is a portfolio of small company returns less a portfolio of large 
companies. HML is a portfolio of high book-to-market companies less a portfolio of low book-to-market firms. Portfolios were formed based on 
the top and bottom 30% of a universe of New Zealand companies listed between 1993 and 2006 including delisted companies. Parameters 
were estimated over the period -375,-126. 
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Panel B shows the cumulative abnormal returns for each sample. Notably we 
observe that the profitability of the pre-change samples is largely dependant on the 
trades in the right direction. Pre-change purchases for instance rely on trades in the 
right direction which earn on average nearly 6% to make up for the insignificant but 
positive returns on the neutral and no news categories and the slight losses on the 
trades followed by announcements in the wrong direction. Likewise, sales see very 
strongly significant returns of 14.17% when the news is in the right direction and 
insignificant returns otherwise. The post-change samples by contrast have no 
category with significant returns and all categories earn similar levels of cumulative 
abnormal returns. This suggests that the pre-change profitability is largely driven by 
upcoming announcements while post-change is largely independent of the news.  
 
In Table 4 we further separate the sample by the type of announcement that 
occurs to see if there are particular categories of news that insiders trade ahead of. 
Announcements were separated into one of seven categories, Earnings 
Announcements, Earnings and Profit Forecasts, Board and Management Changes, 
Capital Structure Information, Restructuring Information, General Business 
Information and Miscellaneous Information. The results for the Earnings and Profit 
Forecasts are not reported due to the very small numbers for all sub-samples for that 
category. For most of the categories there is little change in the percentage of 
transactions followed by an announcement of that type between the pre and post-
change periods. However, there is a significant decrease in the percentage of trades 
followed by earnings announcements for both purchases (decreases by 12%) and 
sales (decreases by 21%). This is likely a result of greater visibility as a result of 
continuous disclosure making breaches of black-out periods more obvious combined 
with the increased risk of prosecution.  
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Panel A: Pre Change Purchases
Right Direction W rong Direction Neutral Total
Number % Number % Number % Number
Earnings Announcements 75 67% 36 32% 1 1% 112 30%
Board/Mngt Changes 21 44% 0 0% 27 56% 48 13%
Capital Structure Info 36 88% 1 2% 4 10% 41 11%
Restructuring Info 57 74% 19 25% 1 1% 77 20%
General Business Info 38 90% 3 7% 1 2% 42 11%
Misc Info 24 50% 9 19% 15 31% 48 13%
Panel B: Post Change Purchases
Right Direction W rong Direction Neutral Total
Number % Number % Number % Number
Earnings Announcements 19 50% 17 45% 2 5% 38 18%
Board/Mngt Changes 0 0 0 0 0%
Capital Structure Info 10 36% 11 39% 7 25% 28 14%
Restructuring Info 24 59% 17 41% 0 0% 41 20%
General Business Info 35 83% 7 17% 0 0% 42 20%
Misc Info 8 22% 13 36% 15 42% 36 17%
Panel C: Pre Change Sales
Right Direction W rong Direction Neutral Total
Number % Number % Number % Number
Earnings Announcements 55 65% 27 32% 2 2% 84 32%
Board/Mngt Changes 19 59% 1 3% 12 38% 32 12%
Capital Structure Info 12 60% 7 35% 1 5% 20 8%
Restructuring Info 23 52% 20 45% 1 2% 44 17%
General Business Info 13 30% 30 68% 1 2% 44 17%
Misc Info 18 56% 1 3% 13 41% 32 12%
Panel D: Post Change Sales
Right Direction W rong Direction Neutral Total
Number % Number % Number % Number
Earnings Announcements 4 36% 7 64% 0 0% 11 11%
Board/Mngt Changes 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
Capital Structure Info 5 28% 10 56% 3 17% 18 17%
Restructuring Info 7 28% 18 72% 0 0% 25 24%
General Business Info 2 6% 30 94% 0 0% 32 31%
Misc Info 3 23% 1 8% 9 69% 13 13%
Panel E:Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Announcement Type
Pruchases Sales
Pre Change Post Change Pre Change Post Change
Earnings Announcements 0.0778 ** 0.0398 0.0782 * 0.0013
Board/Mngt Changes -0.001 NA 0.0977 ** 0.0122
Capital Structure Info 0.0576 * 0.0511 * 0.1106 *** 0.0032
Restructuring Info 0.0386 * 0.0035 0.0528 0.0239
General Business Info 0.0752 ** 0.0136 0.0219 0.0214
Misc Info 0.0028 0.0447 0.0767 ** 0.0147  
Table 4: Trade Direction and Insider CARs by News Classification 
Note: * = Significant at 10%, **= Significant at 5% and *** = Significant at 1%. Pre-change includes the 755 
transactions (435 purchases and 340 sales) that occurred between Jan 1996 and Dec 2001. Post-change includes 
the 366 transactions (239 purchases and 127 sales) that occurred between Jan 2003 and Oct 2005. Right 
Direction represents purchases (sales) followed by good (bad) news. Wrong Direction represents purchases 
(sales) followed by bad (good) news. Neutral respresents trades followed by neutral news and No Announcement 
represents trades without an announcement within the following 80 days. Classifications of announcements as 
good, bad or neutral was based the criteria in Appendix 1. Classification by type was undertaken as per the criteria 
in Appendix 1. Abnormal returns were calculated using the Fama and French 3 Factor model such that 
ittitiftmtiitftit HMLSMBrrrr εβββα +++−+=− 321 )( where SMB is a portfolio of small company returns less a 
portfolio of large companies. HML is a portfolio of high book-to-market companies less a portfolio of low book-to-
market firms. Portfolios were formed based on the top and bottom 30% of a universe of New Zealand companies 
listed between 1993 and 2006 including delisted companies. Parameters were estimated over the period -375,-
126. 
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Table 4 also shows a reduction in the number of categories that feature a 
greater than average percentage of trades followed by good news following the 
enactment of the new laws. As seen in Panel A, Pre-change purchases feature four 
types of announcement that are more frequently preceded by trades in the expected 
direction, Earnings Announcements, Capital Structure, Restructuring and General 
Business Information. Panel E which details the CAR’s earned by trades preceding 
each announcement category show that the four above average categories all earn 
significant abnormal returns while the other two categories, Miscellaneous and 
Board/Management Changes are very close to 0. The same pattern appears in the 
pre-change sales results presented in Panel C. Here there are 5 categories above 
the average, the same four as purchases plus Board/Management Changes. Of 
these four, Earnings Announcements, Board/Management Changes, Capital 
Structure and General Business Information, earn significant abnormal returns. The 
fifth, Restructuring Information, has similar levels of news in the right direction, 52%, 
as in the wrong direction, 45%. This is smaller difference between right and wrong 
direction trades especially in relation to the other announcement categories offers 
one possible reason for why this category earns insignificant abnormal returns. Even 
with the high number of trades in the wrong direction, this category still earns 
economically if not statistically significant returns of 5.28%.  
 
The pattern for the post-change sample is vastly different. Post-change 
purchases (Panel B) have three categories with high percentages of trades followed 
by news in the right direction, Earnings announcements, Restructuring and General 
Business news. Of these however, all have reduced percentages from the pre-
change sample, 17, 15 and 7% respectively, and none earn significant cumulative 
abnormal returns. The only category to earn significant abnormal returns is Capital 
Structure Information which has more trades followed by news in the wrong direction 
than the right direction. Post-change sales demonstrate an even bigger change with 
no categories featuring more than 36% in the right direction (except 
Board/Management Changes which has only 1 trade total) and no categories that 
earn significant cumulative abnormal returns.  
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The results suggest that prior to the enactment of the new legislation insiders 
significantly outperformed the market when they entered into trades. When we 
examine these trades in relation to upcoming news announcements we find that 
insider purchases and sales occur most frequently before announcements in the 
expected direction. Further, the abnormal returns earned by insiders are driven by 
trades followed by news in the expected direction. When this is examined based on 
the type of announcement we again find a direct relationship between the 
announcement categories with the highest percentage of trades in the expected 
direction and the out performance of the market by insiders. These findings suggest 
that insiders prior to the law changes were basing their investment decisions on 
specific knowledge of the likely market reaction to upcoming announcements. This 
basis seems to have altered post-change with marked decreases in the number of 
trades made prior to announcements in the right direction for both sales and 
purchases and the lack of a relationship between these trades and the returns 
earned by insiders.  
 
Market Mispricing 
The second widely suggested basis for insiders profits is so called market mispricing. 
This relies on the belief that insiders by virtue of their intimate knowledge of the 
company have a much better ability to accurately price the fundamental value of the 
company and exploit deviations from the fundamental price (Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001)). This gives them the ability to time their trades such that they purchase or sell 
shares in the company when the market value is sufficiently different from the 
fundamental value to enable them to significantly outperform the market (Seyhun 
(1992), Rozeff and Zamen (1998) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2003)). Insiders use 
of such information provides valuable information to the market about the true price 
of the company and leads to more accurate pricing of shares (Fishman and Hagerty 
(1992), Khanna and Slezak (1994)). This has huge benefits to the market which is 
why insider trading based on this superior pricing ability is encouraged in most laws 
unlike knowledge of specific price-sensitive announcements. However, market 
mispricing is also likely to earn smaller and less certain abnormal returns as it 
requires the market to fully recognise the deviation from the fundamental value and 
correct the prices before insiders are rewarded (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). Use of 
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specific knowledge on the other hand, relies on the market to react to the information 
content of the announcement which is more predictable.  
 
If insiders are predominantly relying on mispricing rather than specific 
knowledge of upcoming announcements, then you should observe a particular 
pattern in the abnormal returns. Specifically, you should see declining CAR’s prior to 
a purchase followed by an increase in the abnormal returns and the opposite for 
sales, increasing CAR’s before the transaction and declining following. This is the 
pattern observed in Figures 1 and 2 for the post-change sample and is supported by 
the results in Panel A of Table 5 which shows the CARs for the total test period, -
125,80, and various event windows within that period. As can be seen both the pre-
change samples show CARs in the same direction through-out the entire test period, 
positive for purchases and negative for sales. If insiders were predominantly 
exploiting deviations from the fundamental value you would expect the opposite signs 
prior to the trade. The post-change samples do exhibit these patterns although the 
CARs earned are insignificant. Prior to the trade date purchase companies see CARs 
of -1.27% while sales firms gain 0.4%.  
 
Calvo and Lasfer (2003) point out that it should be more obvious when 
insiders are using mispricing if you look at those companies that are most prone to 
deviations from the fundamental price. In particular growth firms, or firms with low 
book to market ratios, tend to be overvalued while value firms, those with high book 
to market ratios, tend to be undervalued (Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vichny (1994)). Insiders trading in these particular types of firms should 
be more profitable as the deviation from the true value is much greater providing 
more opportunity to profit. We find little evidence of a difference in the pre-change 
abnormal returns earned by insiders when we separate the sample based on book to 
market ratios. In both cases the only significant CARs occur after the trade and the 
pre-trade abnormal returns are positive (negative) for purchases (sales). In contrast 
the post-change results strongly suggest evidence of insiders trading based on 
mispricing. For the purchases (sales) we see significant cumulative abnormal returns 
for the high (low) book to market firms after the trade as expected. We also observe 
significant decreases (increases) in the CARs in the event window immediately prior 
to the trade suggesting that insiders are timing their trades to maximise their 
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abnormal returns. As expected we also see significant differences between the high 
and low book to market CARs. 
 
 
Panel A: All Trades
Pre-Change Post-Change
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
-125,80 0.0561 *** -0.0722 ** 0.0092 -0.0086
-125,-60 0.0078 -0.0124 -0.0029 -0.0070
-59,-1 0.0093 -0.0001 -0.0098 0.0114
0,80 0.0390 *** -0.0597 *** 0.0219 -0.0130
Panel B: Insider Purchases Seperated by BM
Pre-Change Post-Change
Low BM High BM Difference Low BM High BM Difference
-125,80 0.0973 *** 0.0644 *** 0.0328 0.0067 0.0452 *** -0.0385 **
-125,-60 0.0211 0.0093 0.0118 0.0115 -0.0103 0.0218
-59,-1 0.0230 0.0227 0.0003 -0.0065 -0.0139 * 0.0074
0,80 0.0532 *** 0.0324 * 0.0207 0.0017 0.0694 *** -0.0677 ***
Panel C: Insider Sales Seperated by BM
Pre-Change Post-Change
Low BM High BM Difference Low BM High BM Difference
-125,80 -0.0765 ** -0.0856 * 0.0090 -0.0779 ** 0.0223 -0.1002 ***
-125,-60 -0.0274 -0.0193 -0.0081 -0.0019 0.0100 -0.0119
-59,-1 0.0188 0.0215 -0.0027 0.0406 * 0.0219 0.0186
0,80 -0.0679 ** -0.0878 ** 0.0199 -0.1167 *** -0.0097 -0.1070 ***  
 
Table 5: Market Mispricing 
 
Note: * = Significant at 10%, **= Significant at 5% and *** = Significant at 1%. Pre-change 
includes the 755 transactions (435 purchases and 340 sales) that occurred between Jan 1996 
and Dec 2001. Post-change includes the 366 transactions (239 purchases and 127 sales) that 
occurred between Jan 2003 and Oct 2005. Abnormal returns were calculated using the Fama 
and French 3 Factor model such that 
ittitiftmtiitftit HMLSMBrrrr εβββα +++−+=− 321 )( where SMB is a portfolio of small 
company returns less a portfolio of large companies. HML is a portfolio of high book-to-market 
companies less a portfolio of low book-to-market firms. Portfolios were formed based on the top 
and bottom 30% of a universe of New Zealand companies listed between 1993 and 2006 
including delisted companies. Parameters were estimated over the period -375,-126. Low BM 
includes the lowest 30% of trades based on the previous end of calendar year book-to-market 
ratio. High BM includes the highest 30% of trades based on the previous end of calendar year 
book-to-market ratio. 
 
 
The results overall suggest that the differences observed in the cumulative 
abnormal returns earned by insiders between the pre and post-change samples are 
driven by a difference in the informational basis of the trades. Pre-change in an 
environment of very lax enforcement and no continuous disclosure we find that 
insiders predominantly trade prior to and in the same direction as the upcoming 
announcement, i.e. we find purchases before good news and sales before bad news. 
It is also apparent that the insiders ability to outperform the market is driven by trades 
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that occur prior to news in the expected direction suggesting a reliance on the market 
reaction to the information to earn abnormal returns. After the introduction of stiff new 
laws that increase the possibility of enforcement and require all insiders to disclose in 
a timely fashion insiders appear to trade predominantly based on their superior ability 
to price the company. This is apparent in their ability to time their trades such that 
they purchase when prices are low and sell when they are high. Insiders also do 
significantly better when in situations with the greatest mispricing. Overall it appears 
that the new laws have had a significant impact on the harm from insider trading and 
have done much to encourage the most beneficial types of trades.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The role of regulation and efficacy in controlling the actions and harm from insider 
trading have not been examined in great detail. Yet this lack of scholarly attention 
has not prevented over 80% of the countries with financial markets from regulating 
insider trading (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)). What research has been conducted 
has not found consistent results on the issue of whether insider trading laws can be 
effective in controlling insider trading. Much of the dissent centres on the issue of the 
profitability of insider transactions and the information they use to profit. In particular, 
two sources of profitability are open to insiders, their superior ability to price the firm 
which allows them to detect and exploit inaccurate or unpriced information and their 
knowledge of specific upcoming announcements and the likely effect this will have on 
the price. However, whether regulations can force insiders to trade only on the less 
harmful information, knowledge of mispricing, rather than the more profitable 
knowledge of material information has yet to be comprehensively established. This 
paper addressed these issues within the context of a non-US market to add the 
experiences of another market to help understand the effect of regulation. The New 
Zealand experience also offers the advantage of jointly allowing an examination of 
the effect of the structure and strictness of the laws in affecting insider trading, as the 
law change being examined involved a marked increase in the cost of insider trading 
as well as a reduction in its benefit.  
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We examine directors’ transactions prior and post the introduction of the new 
and stricter laws. Employing the Fama and French 3 factor model we observe 
significant out-performance of the market pre-change by directors but not post-
change. This change appears to be related to the informational base of the trades 
which also changes following the introduction of the new laws. Pre-change insiders 
traded prior to news announcements in the right direction (i.e purchases before good 
news and sales before bad news) far more frequently than before news in the wrong 
direction. The trades followed by news in the right direction also drove the profitability 
of insiders trades. These patterns were also reinforced when announcements were 
separated by announcement type. Post-change transactions by contrast showed little 
evidence of these patterns. In fact post-change transactions were only shown to 
outperform in situations where the company was most prone to deviations between 
the market price and fundamental price (i.e sales for growth firms and purchases for 
value firms). Overall the results show that the new laws have been effective in both 
reducing the profitability of insiders and forcing insiders away from the most profitable 
information, profiting from the knowledge of upcoming announcements.  
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APPENDIX A: CLASSIFICATION TABLE  
Good News Events 
Increase of at least 5% over last years EPS (if semi-annually over the same period) 
Increase of at least 3% in dividends 
Company awarded a contract 
Prediction of record income (even if below 5% increase per share) 
Strike ended, negotiations spurred hope of settlement, settlement with union 
Reopening of plant 
Rehiring 
Litigation settled in favour of company 
Announcement of extra dividends 
Production, development or marketing of a new product; discovery of new oil etc 
Received or purchases a license, right or patent for new products etc 
Expansion of business or plant; joint market venture 
Acquisition or plans to acquire other companies; approval of a merger etc 
Merger if target company 
Announcement of a stock dividend or stock split 
Action against competitors 
Initial Public Offering 
Dividend Initiations 
New Exchange Listings 
Share Repurchases 
Spin-off 
Acquisition of large block by an investor 
Other 
 
Bad News Events 
Decrease in Earnings compared to last year (same quarter) 
Decrease in dividends 
Contract cancelled 
Prediction of sales or income decrease 
Strike started, negotiations broken off, conflict with union, strike continues 
Plant Closing  
Layoffs 
Litigation settled against the company 
Unfavourable action by a government agency 
Downward revision of planned sales or production 
Announcement of sales decline 
Seasoned Equity Offering 
Dividend Omission 
Asset/Investment Sales 
Other 
  
Announcement Categories 
1 Actual Earnings Announcements by Management 
2 Forecasts of Earnings by Management 
3 Analyst Recommendations and Information regarding Credit Ratings 
4 Capital Structure Related Information 
5 Restructuring Related Information 
6 General Business Related Information 
7 Miscellaneous 
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NOTES 
1 Studies showing the profitability of insiders have examined a number of markets 
such as  i.e for the US (Jaffe (1974a), Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986, 1998), Rozeff 
and Zaman (1988) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)), Canada (Baesel and Stein, 
1979), Spain (Del Brio, Miguel and Perote, 2002), New Zealand (Etebari, Tourani-
Rad and Gilbert, 2004) and the U.K. (Pope, Morris and Peel, 1990, Friederich, 
Gregory, Matatko and Tonks, 2002) and virtually uniformly show insiders earn 
abnormal returns. 
 
2 A few cases did result in out of court settlements repaying the profits earned by the 
insider. However, other more severe non-financial penalties were avoided by these 
actions making the punishment significantly smaller than it should have been.  
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